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vABSTRACT 
Under what conditions are militant groups more likely to experience intra-
organizational conflict?  This paper seeks to contribute to the rebel group and political 
violence literature by drawing upon the insights of previous scholarship in these areas, 
and from organizational theory and social identity theory, to identify these conditions. 
These factors are then tested using a sample of militant ethno-political groups in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) collected within the Minorities at Risk 
Organizational Behavior (MAROB) Database. 
The results of multiple regression analyses indicate that these groups experience a 
systematic increase in the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict when they 
experience a loss of unified leadership, when they attempt to govern territory, when they 
obtain legal recognition from the state, when they receive foreign assistance, and when 
they promote authoritarian views. The results also demonstrate that state violence against 
these groups had no consistent influence on their likelihood of experiencing intra-
organizational conflict. These findings point the way for additional research on the 
interactions between ethnic identity and state violence. They also hold important 
implications for policymakers and military planners, as events, policies, or actions which 
affect the above factors can be expected to affect levels of intra-organizational conflict. In 
contrast, the direct use of state violence appears unlikely to generate systematic increases 
or decreases in group intra-organizational conflict. 
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A. WHY STUDY ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT?  
Intra-organizational conflict, particularly when it passes the threshold of violence, 
is an indication of organizational dysfunction, reduced capacity to dedicate resources to 
any external missions, and an increased likelihood of division into splinter groups.  
Policymakers and militaries with a stake in defeating or supporting militant groups, and 
scholars trying to understand the behavior of these groups, therefore have a natural 
interest in understanding which conditions, events, policies, or actions tend to increase or 
decrease internal conflict.  For instance, decision makers supporting a counterinsurgency 
effort may find it advantageous to increase such internal conflict to make groups less 
effective.1  A group experiencing internal conflict may also be more susceptible to 
policymaker or military attempts to buy off, co-opt, or otherwise pacify part of the once-
united group.2 
On the other hand, policymakers or military planners may want a group to be 
stable and united, and therefore may want to support the conditions which would make 
the group less likely to experience internal conflict. From the perspective of supporting 
the group in achieving aims, this is relatively straightforward.  However, even those 
working against a group might want it to be united.  Having a unified rebel force may 
help a government during negotiations leading to a post-conflict peace arrangement.3  A 
group already experiencing internal conflict may be more likely to spawn spoiler groups.  
Spoiler groups can make enduring peace deals difficult if not impossible, as their entire 
reason for being is to undermine progress and to keep the conflict alive.  A group that 
divides due to internal conflict may also create splinter groups that use violence4 against 
                                                 
1 Jason Lyall, “Are Co-Ethnics More Effective Counter-Insurgents? Evidence from the Second 
Chechen War,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 1 (February 2010): 1–20. 
2 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Ethnic Defection in Civil War,” Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 8 (August 
2008): 1043–1068. 
3 Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, “Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining: How Internal 
Divisions Generate Civil Conflict,” American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 3 (July 2013): 659–672. 
4 Reed M. Wood and Jacob D. Kathman, “Competing for the Crown: Inter-Rebel Competition and 
Civilian Targeting in Civil War,” Political Research Quarterly 68, no. 1 (March 2015): 167–179. 
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civilians and government targets to demonstrate that they continue to have credible force. 
This foreseeable negative consequence might serve as a counterargument to policy or 
military action which might increase internal conflict in groups. 
For policymakers and military practitioners,5 these nuances can be critical. A key 
part of understanding rebel groups, both from a counterinsurgency and unconventional 
warfare perspective, is in understanding the conditions under which they are more likely 
to experience intra-organizational conflict.  This can be a symptom of dysfunction or of 
impending division. 
B. WHY STUDY MILITANT ETHNOPOLITICAL GROUPS?  
Militant ethno-political groups stand at the nexus of several areas of national 
security concern:  oppressive regimes, insurgencies, terrorist threats, and sectarian 
violence.  Their existence, failures, and successes can create human suffering, refugee 
crises, and threats to critical global resources.  Because history is replete with examples 
of rebel action and violence, and over 75% of contemporary conflict is civil,6 or intra-
state, rather than inter-state, there is a need to study the nature of these groups and how 
they behave under the influence of various internal and external factors. 
Ethnicity also seems to be an aggravating factor in conflict. It may even be 
uniquely dangerous7 among the many factors contributing to the onset, severity, and 
longevity of conflict.  Because ethnicity is a “sticky”8 confluence of identity 
characteristics that may include race, religion, values, culture, and language, it can lend 
conflicts a particularly vicious and insoluble character. Scholars, policymakers, and 
military planners therefore need to better understand the logic underpinning how militant 
ethno-political groups form, how they justify and legitimize their use of violence to 
                                                 
5 Sean McClure, “Review of Paul Staniland: Networks of Rebellion,” Special Warfare Review 27, no. 
4 (October-December 2014): 27. The author describes military applications for Staniland’s insights into 
rebel group behavior and dynamics. 
6 Wendy Pearlman and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, “Nonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and 
Conflict Processes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 1 (February 2012): 3–15. 
7 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
8 Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), 92. 
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achieve their ends, and the conditions which tend to unite them and to cause intra-
organizational conflict.  
From a government and military context in particular, counter-rebel or 
counterinsurgency doctrine and operations have been and continue to be important. 
Governments and militaries naturally need to understand militant ethno-political groups, 
especially when they act as insurgent forces against governments, in order to effectively 
conduct counterinsurgency.9  Just as importantly, governments and militaries need to 
understand how to provide “support to insurgent forces”10 from an unconventional 
warfare perspective. 
C. A DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM 
1. Research Question 
What factors systematically affect the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict in 
militant ethno-political groups?   
2. Methodology 
This study uses multiple regression models to examine the effects of a wide range 
of internal and external factors, on the probability of a intra-organizational conflict within 
militant ethno-political groups in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Examining 
the MENA region is of particular importance, given the U.S. 2015 National Security 
Strategy,11 which indicates that one of the top five key goals of securing the international 
order is to “Seek Stability and Peace in the Middle East and North Africa.”  In the MENA 
region, we see one of the global economy’s most critical energy sources threatened by 
multiple and long-standing oppressive regimes, insurgencies, terrorist threats, sectarian 
violence, human suffering, and refugee crises. 
                                                 
9 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication 3–24 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, November 22, 2013). 
10 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, Joint Publication 3–05 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2014). 
11 Barack H. Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015). 
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3. Results of Interest 
The results show that there is statistical evidence to support several hypotheses 
concerning the important drivers of the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict in 
militant MENA ethno-political groups.  Foreign support, organizational legality, the 
attempt to control territory, a pro-authoritarian agenda, and a loss of leadership unity, are 
all shown to systematically increase the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict.  In 
contrast, state violence against the group does not appear to have a statistically significant 
effect.  The thesis concludes with a discussion of the broader importance of these results, 
including how these findings comport with previous scholarship and theories, what they 
suggest for future research possibilities, and their implications for policymakers and 
military planners.  
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II. BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
A. THE FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION FRAMEWORK 
The essence of the frustration-aggression hypothesis, as originally introduced by 
Dollard et al. in 1939,12 was later refined and applied to examining the causes of political 
violence by authors such as Ted Robert Gurr,13 and Ivo and Rosalind Firabend.14 
Although these authors use slightly different formulations of the frustration-aggression 
hypothesis, we might summarize their views as follows: 
Individuals and groups, frustrated in the attainment of goals, 
particularly when the frustration is perceived as a surprise, an 
injustice, or a relative deprivation, tend to use emotional and/or 
instrumental aggression against the perceived agents of frustration. 
The definition of “frustration” is “prevented from reaching a desired objective,” 
and the definition of “aggression” is hostile emotional and/or instrumental use of force 
against a target person or group.15  It is important to note that while individuals and 
groups experiencing frustration may very well have non-aggressive responses to that 
frustration, such as resignation or sublimation, the hypothesis here only applies to groups 
which have chosen the aggression response to frustration.  In other words, this analysis 
examines the sub-set of cases in which the frustration-aggression pathway has in fact 
been followed, with aggression taking the form of either militant group behavior against 
the state, or intra-organizational conflict as a result of group dysfunction or intra-
organizational frustration processes. 
                                                 
12 J. Dollard, L. W. Doob, N. E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer, and R. R. Sears, Frustration and Aggression 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Freer, 1939). 
13 Ted Robert Gurr, “Psychological Factors in Civil War,” in Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories 
and Research, ed. Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Ted Robert Gurr (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1972), 31;  Ted Robert Gurr, “A Causal Model of Strife:  A Comparative Analysis Using 
New Indices,” in Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories and Research, ed. Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. 
Feierabend, and Ted Robert Gurr (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 184. 
14 Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, “Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression:  An 
Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory,” in Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories and Research, 
ed. Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Ted Robert Gurr (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1972), 136. 
15 Leonard Berkowitz, “Frustration-aggression Hypothesis: Examination and Reformulation,” 
Psychological Bulletin 106, no. 1 (July 1989): 59–73. 
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That is, the hypothesis, as applied to intra-organizational conflict in militant 
MENA groups, is here applied on the state-versus-group level, and also at the group 
versus sub-group level.  The hypothesis applies at the state versus group level in that the 
group is posited to be a manifestation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis.  Factors 
which support the logic and function of the group as a manifestation of the frustration-
aggression hypothesis are therefore expected to reduce intra-organizational conflict.  
Factors which undermine or distract from the logic and rhetoric justifying the existence 
and militancy of the group, and factors which might trigger frustration-aggression 
responses within the militant group itself, are therefore expected to increase intra-
organizational conflict. 
If ethno-political groups turn to violence, the groups will often justify and explain 
their use of aggression as a consequence of being unfairly denied or frustrated in their 
attempts to gain their rightful access to needs or desires.   A man who shakes and kicks a 
soda machine that stole his money is exemplifying the frustration-aggression dynamic at 
the individual level. A militant ethnopolitical group in MENA that uses violence against a 
state that it perceives to have unjustly denied its desires or needs is following the same 
dynamic at a collective or group level. If an organization has a charter, it may very well 
describe the nature of the frustrations it has experienced as one of its core justifications 
for aggression. 
For example, the rebel American colonists, in the Declaration of Independence of 
1776,16 first described a list of rights unjustly denied by the crown, and the colonists’ 
many frustrated non-violent attempts to seek redress of those grievances.   Then, having 
laid out the injustices perpetrated by the crown and the frustrations resulting from non-
violent attempts to achieve justice, the authors conclude that they are justified in using 
aggression against the crown; they declare independence and the intent to use violent 
resistance.  The logic of frustration-aggression maps well to the logic of the document. 
                                                 
16 Thomas Jefferson, “The Declaration of Independence,” Historic American Documents, Lit2Go 
Edition, (1776), accessed October 16, 2016, http://etc.usf.edu/lit2go/133/historic-american-
documents/4957/the-declaration-of-independence/. 
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Similarly, the Hamas Covenant17 declares that Palestine is being unjustly occupied by 
oppressive Zionists, that non-violent means to regain Palestine and to throw off 
oppression have been frustrated, and that therefore aggression is required. The same goes 
for the founding documents of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,18 which describe how 
Western colonial powers divided the Islamic world following World War 1 and installed 
puppet regimes in order to suppress and frustrate all true practice of Islam. In the face of 
such longstanding oppression and frustration, these documents argue that the only way 
for true Islam to return to the world is to carve out a new Caliphate using violence.  
Indeed, the frustration-aggression logic is implicit in the foundational documents of all of 
these groups. 
B. EXISTING MODELS OF INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT 
Scholars such as Kathleen Cunningham,19 Paul Staniland,20,21 Wendy 
Pearlman,22 and Christia Fontini23 have studied factors such as organizational leadership 
structure, use of violence by and against groups, and dozens of other variables which are 
posited to impact the internal and external dynamics of rebel groups.   Also useful is the 
literature on Political Process Theory and the concept of changing “political opportunity 
structures,”24 which provides insight into a tremendous and varied range of factors to 
                                                 
17 “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement HAMAS,” Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/book/islam-9780195174304/islam-9780195174304-chapter-
66 (accessed 15-Dec-2016). 
18  Ahmed Hashim, “The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate,” Middle East Policy 
21, no. 4 (Winter 2014): 70. 
19 Kristin Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Lee Seymour, “A Plague of Initials: 
Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (June 2012): 
265–283. 
20 Paul Staniland, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place; Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the 
Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 1 (February 2012): 16–40. 
21 Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2014). 
22 Wendy Pearlman, “Precluding Nonviolence, Propelling Violence: The Effect of Internal 
Fragmentation on Movement Behavior,” Studies in Comparative International Development 47, no. 1 
(March 2012): 23–46. 
23 Christia Fontini, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
2. 
24 Robert D. Benford, David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and 
Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (August 2000): 611–639. 
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consider when examining intra-group and inter-group dynamics.  Other scholars have 
looked directly at effects of external competition25 and external threats26 on groups, and 
have found that they tend to reinforce group identities and even cohesion.  Some of this 
work is predicated on identity theory concepts related to the formation, strengthening, 
and weakening of in-group and out-group bonds in response to various pressures. 
More directly relevant to this analysis are the papers by Asal et al., and Warren 
and Troy, who looked specifically at dependent and independent variables similar to the 
variables of this paper, and in the same area of concern.  Therefore, their work was most 
instrumental in generating the logic of this paper and in the interpretation of the findings. 
Warren and Troy, in a 2015 paper,27 looked at the sub-group and supra-group 
factors associated with ethnopolitical group violence. This paper, which includes data 
from both militant and non-militant organizations, posits that internal and external 
fragmenting and suppressing forces should affect the likelihood of internal conflict in a 
curvilinear manner when plotted against organization size. The paper posits that three 
factors:  ethnic group size, strength of ethnic group cohesion, and democratic constraints 
against government action, should all impact the probability of group fragmentation. The 
authors use the Minorities at Risk dataset, augmented with data from other datasets to 
gain additional insight into such organizational and state features as the size of groups, 
ethnic cohesion strength, and democratic or autocratic nature of the government.  Their 
primary finding is that the likelihood of group intra-organizational violence follows a 
curvilinear form when plotted against the size of the group as a proportion of the 
population, with a size of 25% of the population having the highest likelihood of 
violence. This peak is the “sweet spot” where the ratio of fragmenting forces to 
suppressing forces is highest.   
                                                 
25 Daan Scheepers et al., “The Social Functions of Ingroup Bias: Creating, Confirming, or Changing 
Social Reality,” European Review of Social Psychology 17, no. 1 (July 2006): 359–96. 
26 Blake M. Riek et al., “Does a Common Ingroup Identity Reduce Intergroup Threat?,” Group 
Processes & Intergroup Relations 13, no.4 (June 2010): 403–423. 
27 Warren, T. Camber and Kevin K. Troy, “Explaining Violent Intra-Ethnic Conflict: Group 
Fragmentation in the Shadow of State Power,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 3 (April 2015): 484–
509. 
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Asal et al., in a 2012 paper,28 looked at the impact of united leadership, 
organizational legality, organizational use of violence, state use of violence, and external 
support to the organization on the likelihood of the group experiencing a split. Although 
the independent variables were different, the dependent variable was different, and the 
study included both militant and non-militant groups, the basic logic and methodology 
underlying the study is relatively close to what this paper is trying to accomplish. The 
study found that groups without a unified leadership were more likely to experience 
organizational split, but found no statistically-relevant results concerning the effects of 
state use of violence, foreign support or organizational legality. 
C. HYPOTHESES DERIVED FROM THE FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION 
FRAMEWORK  
Using the frustration-aggression framework as the primary model for the 
dynamics of militant ethno-political group behavior, several external and internal 
variables are hypothesized to systematically affect the likelihood of intra-organizational 
conflict.  The definition of intra-organizational conflict utilized here focuses on the 
collective use of violence by members of the group against one another. This definition, 
while broad, has a high enough threshold of intensity for it to indicate a significant threat 
to the stability and operational effectiveness of the group.  Therefore, intra-organizational 
conflict is of general interest to scholars, and of special interest to policymakers and 
military planners interested in the health and behavior of these groups. 
Within the literature and in the available data, a number of potential independent 
variables can be hypothesized to have a predictable effect on intra-organizational conflict.  
I will discuss each in turn. 
                                                 
28 Victor Asal, Mitchell Brown, and Angela Dalton, “Why Split? Organizational Splits among 
Ethnopolitical Organizations in the Middle East,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 1 (February 
2012): 94–117. 
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1. Leadership Unity 
Mainstream social movement theory29 posits that centralized leadership reduces 
the likelihood of intra-organizational divides, and this protective effect might reasonably 
be expected to extend to reducing the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict.  A 
unified leadership might be less likely to engage in or to allow internal political struggles 
for the relative influence of different sub-factions within the organization, leading to 
fewer preconditions for organizational divides. If a group claims to exist as an external 
manifestation of one major frustration for the group, it seems group conflict might 
decrease with united leadership, because the group can more credibly claim to represent a 
coherent narrative, tactics, strategies, and desired end state to overcome that frustration.  
Competing or divided leadership can also increase organizational dysfunction and 
conflict, where sub-group leaders can play two-level games30 such as tactically 
preserving their own resources at the expense of achieving the larger group’s strategic 
objectives.31 Divided or competing leadership structures are more likely to allow such 
defection and resource-hoarding activity, as they do not have a single dispassionate 
authority to track and punish the behavior equitably. 
Although the above reasons might seem to suggest that a united leadership would 
tend to reduce the likelihood of a rebel group dividing, there are also plausible reasons 
why the reverse might be the case. Perhaps groups with a united leadership are less 
tolerant of any dissent, and therefore are more likely to purge or spin off sub-groups. 
Sub-groups with dissenting opinions might also be more likely to actively choose to 
divide from the group because they are not given the leeway to pursue their distinct 
agendas or strategies within the group.  If this were the case, it might be that a divided 
leadership would actually decrease the probability of the group dividing, because the 
culture of the organization is more tolerant of dissent and alternative tactics and strategies 
                                                 
29 Deborah B. Balser, “The Impact of Environmental Factors on Factionalism and Schism in Social 
Movement Organizations.” Social Forces 76, no. 1 (September 1997): 199–228. 
30 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International 
Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427–460. 
31 Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2008), 59. 
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co-existing within the same “big tent” organizational structure. There have been 
instances, as in political parties, where organizations benefit from intentionally promoting 
the coexistence and struggles of divided leadership. Some advantages could include the 
ability of the divided group to 
target and attract different segments of the population, to provide 
participants with greater programmatic mobility, to offer flexibility for 
reorganization and interfactional coordination, and to accommodate the 
adoption of radical organizational tactics by factions without 
compromising the tactical doctrine of the original organization.32 
While some of these benefits may accrue to the group, nevertheless, in accordance 
with the logic of the frustration-aggression hypothesis, it is hypothesized that by 
reinforcing the group’s frustration-aggression hypothesis justification, this factor 
increases group unity and thereby decreases the likelihood of intra-organizational 
conflict.  In addition, this framework implies that the impact of these divisions may be 
particularly severe when they represent recent shifts in leadership structures. 
 
Hypothesis 1:   Unified leadership reduces the likelihood of  
intra-organizational conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 1b:   A decline from unified leadership to divided leadership 
increases the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict. 
 
2. Foreign Support 
Foreign support might create resource battles within the group, or inject 
contradictory tactics, strategies, and end states into the group.33 The mere injection of 
resources into the group can lead to the “curse of resources,” with low-commitment 
recruits, jealousy, and morale problems. Just as the “curse of resources” may stunt the 
                                                 
32 Victor Asal, Mitchell Brown, and Angela Dalton, “Why Split? Organizational Splits among 
Ethnopolitical Organizations in the Middle East,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 1 (February 
2012): 95. 
33 Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1978). 
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normal growth of states and increase their susceptibility to internal division or civil war, 
rebel groups also face these challenges.34  Sometimes organizations realize that external 
support is a direct threat to their continued use of their primary narrative, as when Action 
Directe abandoned its external support relationship with the Red Army Faction after 
“realizing that the only joint attack perpetrated by the two organizations, in which an 
American serviceman was murdered, could tarnish its ‘revolutionary’ image.”35 
The change in overall resources or inequitable distribution of those resources 
could also cause the centrifugal forces of the group to overcome the centripetal forces 
holding it together. On the other hand, some organizations lack the organic resources to 
operate and are therefore mortally dependent on foreign support. For this unfortunate 
sub-set of groups, the many risks of internal conflict that come with foreign support 
entanglements and external agendas may be far preferable to the risks of having no 
resources at all.36  Indeed, there is some evidence that, in the long run, the amount of aid 
to a group is positively correlated with its ability to persevere in conflict, despite the 
internal conflict that that foreign origin of the resources might cause.37 In accordance 
with the logic of the frustration-aggression hypothesis, however, it is hypothesized that 
by undermining or distracting from the group’s frustration-aggression hypothesis 
justification, this factor is likely to undermine group unity and thereby to increase the 
likelihood of intra-organizational conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 2:   Foreign support increases the likelihood of               
intra-organizational conflict. 
 
                                                 
34 Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (August 2005): 598–624.  
35 Ely Karmon, Coalitions between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, Nationalists, and 
Islamists (Leiden: Martinujhoff, 2005), 293. 
36 Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2008), 78. 
37 Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2008), 288. 
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3. Legality 
A militant ethnopolitical group, when legally recognized by the state, may have 
more difficulty in justifying its existence through the frustration/aggression narrative. As 
discussed in recent work by Cederman38 and several39 co-authors,40 groups are more 
likely to engage in violent rebellion when they are excluded from political power or even 
the political process itself.  When an organization is legal, it also has broader “political 
opportunity structures,”41 and this may put the militant group in the position of having to 
continually justify its use of violence despite its access to non-violent and more generally 
accepted legal avenues to pursue its aims.  The organization is under greater pressure 
internally and externally to lay down its arms and transition to legitimate and peaceful 
politics.  In accordance with the logic of the frustration-aggression hypothesis, it is 
hypothesized that by undermining or distracting from the group’s frustration-aggression 
justification, this factor undermines group unity and thereby increases the likelihood of 
intra-organizational conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 3:   Organization legality increases the likelihood of       
intra-organizational conflict. 
 
4. State Use of Violence 
A militant ethnopolitical group might be helped, in a fashion, by state violence. 
The group, when attacked by members of an “other” ethnopolitical identity, might 
actually enjoy a strengthening of identity and internal resolve to work together against the 
common enemy of the state. A group-strengthening effect has been observed in cases 
                                                 
38 Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min, “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data 
and Analysis,” World Politics 62, no. 1 (January 2010): 87-119. 
39 Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and 
Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
40 Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A 
Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set,” American Sociological Review 74, no. 2 (April 2009): 
316-337. 
41 Robert D. Benford, David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and 
Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (August 2000): 611–639. 
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where a general threat or competition has driven a group to reinvigorate its internal bonds 
and identity.42 Conversely, the violence could cause the group enough combat losses to 
increase internal conflict or to entirely destroy the organization.43 Losses could trigger a 
significant change in power dynamics between the sub-groups, leading to one or more 
sub-groups clashing with other sub-groups to re-establish a hierarchy of power or to 
punish those responsible for an embarrassing loss.  In accordance with the logic of the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis, however, it is hypothesized that by reinforcing the 
group’s frustration-aggression hypothesis justification, this factor increases group unity 
and thereby decreases the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 4:   State use of violence against a group reduces the 
likelihood of intra-organizational conflict. 
 
5. Territorial Control 
If an organization predicated on the notion of frustration-aggression attempts to 
control territory and engage in governance, it risks being seen as incompetent, being 
attacked by the state, and losing its narrative as a pure anti-establishment phenomenon. It 
then has to defend its own establishment. When a rebel group is actively attempting to 
control territory, there is evidence to suggest that any gains or losses of territory will tend 
to increase internal conflict and even lead to group division.44  Conversely, some 
organizations like Hamas might experience a net benefit, despite the difficulties, from 
engaging in control and governance functions in a territory by building national and 
international support through services and propaganda. In accordance with the logic of 
the frustration-aggression hypothesis, it is hypothesized that by undermining or 
                                                 
42  Daan Scheepers et al., “The Social Functions of Ingroup Bias: Creating, Confirming, or Changing 
Social Reality,” European Review of Social Psychology 17, no. 1 (July 2006): 359–96.   See also:  Blake 
M. Riek et al., “Does a Common Ingroup Identity Reduce Intergroup Threat?,” Group Processes & 
Intergroup Relations 13, no. 4 (June 2010): 403–23.  The authors argue that external competition and 
external threats tend to reinforce group identities and even cohesion. 
43 Christia Fontini, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
44 Michael H. Woldemariam, “Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African 
Insurgencies,” (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2011). 
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distracting from the group’s frustration-aggression hypothesis justification, this factor 
undermines group unity and thereby increases the likelihood of intra-organizational 
conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 5:   Attempting to control or govern territory increases the 
likelihood of intra-organizational conflict. 
 
6. Pro-authoritarian 
A pro-authoritarian agenda might predispose a group to conflict. A group that 
identifies itself as a movement to fight against unfair oppression of a minority group 
might have a difficult time justifying its own autocratic practices and plans for autocratic 
governance in the future. For example, the organization Action Directe experienced a 
major internal conflict and even divided in 1982 over excessively directive and intolerant 
leadership. A sub-group complained that the leader had been excessively 
“authoritarian”45 in his management of the group. Zarqawi of al-Qaeda in Iraq also seems 
to have fallen afoul of this principle in 2006.46  By undermining the group’s frustration-
aggression hypothesis justification, we can expect that this factor undermines group 
unity. 
 
Hypothesis 6:   Advocating authoritarian policies and ideologies 
increases the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict. 
 
Table 1 summarizes these hypothesized relationships.  In short, a group which 
enjoys united leadership, and which faces state violence, might experience less intra-
organizational conflict, as these factors support the logic that the group is a well-
organized and unified manifestation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis, and that the 
                                                 
45 Ely Karmon, Coalitions between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, Nationalists, and 
Islamists (Leiden: Martinujhoff, 2005), 141. 
46 Brian Fishman, “After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” The Washington 
Quarterly 29, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 19–32. 
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group is morally justified in its militancy by the state’s violent oppression against the 
group. 
Table 1. Summary of Hypothesized Effects of Independent Variables on the 
Likelihood of Intra-Organizational Conflict 
 
Independent Variable Effect on Likelihood of     Intra-organizational Conflict 
1 Leadership Unity Decrease 
1b. Drop in Leadership Unity Increase 
2 Foreign Support Increase 
3 Legal Increase 
4 State Violence Decrease 
5 Controls Territory Increase 
6 Pro-Authoritarian Increase 
 
However, foreign support, organizational legality, the attempt to control territory, 
and a group pro-authoritarian agenda are hypothesized to increase the likelihood of intra-
organizational conflict. That is because these factors would undermine or distract from 
the logic and rhetoric of the groups as legitimate and focused manifestations of the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis. Foreign support injects foreign interference and 
conflicting agendas within the group, and may attract low-commitment and profiteering 
membership.  Organizational legality undercuts a group’s logical and rhetorical claims 
that militancy is the only recourse to the injustice.  The attempt to control and govern 
territory introduces the demand to deliver security and good governance under scrutiny, 
exposes the group to accusations of hypocrisy if it cannot deliver, renders the group more 
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easily isolated and targeted by air and other conventional operations.  Finally, a group 
with a pro-authoritarian agenda is likely to create its own frustration-aggression problems 
internally, as authoritarian groups which suppress dissent, especially when they are 
already composed of individuals accustomed, trained, and equipped to do violence, are 













This paper is intended to contribute to the literature on rebel group intra-
organizational conflict and divide, particularly for militant ethno-political groups in the 
MENA region.  The approach taken here has been to identify factors examined in 
previous literature, and then to examine them quantitatively to identify whether there is 
statistical evidence to support various hypotheses about the factors that may affect the 
likelihood of intra-organizational conflict.  Having identified an overarching theoretical 
model, having identified some factors which should affect the likelihood of groups 
experiencing intra-organizational conflict, and having identified the whether these factors 
should increase or decrease the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict, these 
hypotheses are tested against a large dataset describing militant Middle Eastern and North 
African ethno-political group behavior over time. By focusing on militant ethno-political 
groups in the Middle East and  North Africa from 1980–2004, the findings are likely to 
be applicable to ongoing and future efforts to understand and to affect intra-
organizational conflict within that geopolitically-important and embattled region of the 
world. 
For all of the statistical models reported below, the R programming language47 
was used to ingest datasets, recode variables, created models, and produce statistical 
analysis as needed. Using this open source program allows detailed analysis of the coding 
choices used and allows for easy study replication and improved analysis in the future. 
A. THE MAROB DATA SET 
The Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior dataset, directed by the 
researchers at the University of Maryland and the University at Albany, is funded through 
grants from the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Air Force, and the National 
Science Foundation. The stated purpose of the MAROB dataset, which is a branch of the 
Minorities at Risk dataset, is to aid research into the identifying “factors that motivate 
                                                 
47 R Core Team, R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing, R Foundation for 
Statistical Computing, 2016.  https://www.R-project.org. 
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some members of ethnic minorities to become radicalized, to form activist organizations, 
and to move from conventional means of politics and protest into violence and 
terrorism.”48 It includes 118 ethnopolitical organizations, and is coded by the 
organization-year unit of analysis. Organizations are incorporated into the database if 
they are active for three consecutive years, have political goals and activities, and 
“explicitly claim to represent the interests of “one or more ethnic groups and/or the 
organization’s members are primarily members of a specific ethnic minority.”49 The date 
range for the dataset is 1980 to 2004. 
Only those groups which are coded as “militant” in the dataset are included in this 
analysis. A “militant” group is defined as a group which uses violence and weapons, or 
the threat to use violence and weapons, as a means to achieve its objectives. The resulting 
dataset for use in this study includes 66 militant ethnopolitical organizations in 11 
countries. The total number of observations, using the organization-year unit of analysis, 
is 1125 observations. All independent variables are lagged by one year to reduce the risk 
of endogeneity or reverse causation between dependent and independent variables. 
The majority of observations concern militant ethno-political organizations in the 
countries of Lebanon (445 observations), Iraq (309), Israel (145), Jordan (60), and 
Morocco (25). There are a total of 91 observations in countries other than the top five 
listed.   The data are clearly weighted heavily in favor of groups in Lebanon and Iraq, and 
the results should be seen in light of this sensitivity.  Organization-years per ethnic group 
represented include Palestinian (441 observations), Kurds (225), Shi-is (203), Sunnis 
(134), Maronite Christians (37), and Alawi (25).  See Figure 1 for a depiction of the 
MENA region. 
  
                                                 
48 Victor Asal, Amy Pate and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior Data 
and Codebook Version 9/2008 (2008), accessed online at http://www.mar.umd.edu/data.asp. 
49 Victor Asal, Amy Pate and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior Data 
and Codebook Version 9/2008 (2008), accessed online at http://www.mar.umd.edu/data.asp. 
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Figure 1. Map of the Middle East and North Africa Region50 
 
 
B. IDENTIFYING, DESCRIBING, AND PREPARING VARIABLES FOR 
TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
1. Dependent Variable:  Intra-Organizational Conflict 
The dependent variable is coded dichotomously, and an organization is 
considered to experience Intra-Organizational Conflict if it experiences sporadic 
unarmed violent clashes, rioting, armed fighting, assassinations, bombings, or other uses 
of violence against intra-organizational targets. In 2.2% of the observations, 
organizations experienced intra-organizational conflict according to this definition. Note 
that the definition of intra-organizational conflict for the rest of this document will 
consistently mean the use of violence, and not merely argumentation and disagreement. 
2. Independent Variables 
The variables Pro-Authoritarian, Controls Territory, Leadership Unity, Legal, 
State Violence, and Foreign Support are all coded dichotomously. A pairwise correlation 
                                                 
50 Ghina R. Mumtaz, Gabriele Riedner, and Laith J. Abu-Raddad, “The Emerging Face of the HIV 
Epidemic in the Middle East and North Africa,” Current Opinion in HIV and AIDS 9, no. 2 (2014): 183–
191. 
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matrix, which is used to identify independent variables with multicollinearity or other 
confounding logical relationships, reveals that the largest correlation coefficient is -0.358 
between State Violence and Legal.  This moderate negative correlation seems to make 
sense, as one would expect states to less frequently employ violence against groups with 
legally-recognized status.  The moderate 0.252 positive correlation between State 
Violence and Controls Territory might be seen as a normal state reaction to the 
usurpation of state territorial sovereignty.  Similarly, the moderate negative correlation of 
-0.235 between a group attempting to Control Territory and having Legal status may also 
make sense, as militant groups attempting to Control Territory may be more likely to 
have shakier claims to Legal status.  There are several smaller positive and negative 
correlations between the other variables, but none are large enough (for example, a 
correlation over 0.500) to warrant additional scrutiny to discern whether there are 
possible confounding logical relationships like multicollinearity.  Where each variable 
listed on the y-axis intersects with the same variable on the x-axis, the correlation is 
1.000, as the data are identical and perfectly correlated. See Table 2 for correlation matrix 
results. 













Unity 1.000           
Foreign Support 0.022 1.000         
Legal 0.172 -0.104 1.000       
State Violence -0.003 0.191 -0.358 1.000     
Controls 
Territory 0.032 0.194 -0.235 0.252 1.000   
Pro-
Authoritarian 0.038 -0.187 0.030 0.023 -0.034 1.000 
 
An organization is defined as Pro-Authoritarian if the organization advocates 
authoritarian forms of government.  In 10% of the observations, organizations were Pro-
Authoritarian. An organization Controls Territory if it attempts to control and/or govern 
territory for purposes of security or even to attempt independence.  In 20% of the 
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observations, organizations attempted to control movement in a defined territory or 
attempted to set up governance and infrastructure within that territory. An organization 
has Leadership Unity if it has a strong ruling council or a strong single leader.  In 85% of 
the observations, organizations exhibited Leadership Unity.  An organization is Legal if it 
enjoys some amount of legal recognition and legitimacy from the state.  In 50% of the 
observations, organizations are coded this way.  An organization is coded as experiencing 
State Violence if the state uses lethal violence against the organization sometimes or 
regularly.  This occurred in 22% of the observations. Finally, the Foreign Support 
variable records whether a group receives any combination of support from diaspora, 
foreign states, international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, 
or cross-border insurgency allies.  In 50% of the observations, organizations received 
Foreign Support. 
C. MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
The models estimated below are multivariate logistic models with independent 
variables lagged one year to reduce the risks of the endogeneity and reverse causation 
problems. The first model incorporates the independent variables as static values, while 
the second model incorporates the leadership value as a drop, or step down, from 
Leadership Unity to divided leadership. This second model looks for the effects of a 
change in leadership type, rather than looking for the effects of a static leadership type. 
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IV. RESULTS 
The results support the statistical significance and the substantive significance of 
several variables, as detailed here. 
A. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
The results show a statistically significant effect for Foreign Support, Legal, 
Controls Territory, and Pro-Authoritarian. There did not appear to be a statistically 
significant result for Leadership Unity or State Violence (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Logit Regression Results: Conflict vs. Leadership Level  
 
 
The findings of the initial model are shown in Table 3 and summarized in Table 4.  
The model indicates that while the Leadership Unity and State Violence variables did not 
produce statistically significant results, the other variables did.  First, the model shows 
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that groups with Foreign Support are systematically more likely to experience intra-
organizational conflict, with a p-value of <0.05.  In addition, groups with Legal status are 
systematically more likely to experience intra-organizational conflict, with a p-value of 
<0.01.  If an organization Controls Territory, it is systematically more likely to 
experience intra-organizational conflict, with a p-value of <0.01, and the Pro-
Authoritarian factor makes groups systematically more likely to experience an increase 
in intra-organizational conflict with a p-value of <0.05.   
Table 4. Results of Testing Hypotheses Using First Model 
 Independent Variable 
Predicted Effect on Intra-
organizational Conflict Results 
1 Leadership Unity Decrease No Statistically Significant Finding 
2 Foreign Support Increase Increase 
3 Legal Increase Increase 
4 State Violence Decrease No Statistically Significant Finding 
5 Controls Territory Increase Increase 
6 Pro-Authoritarian Increase Increase 
 
In the second model, the Drop in Leadership Unity variable shows the effects of a 
drop in leadership, from unified to divided, on intra-organizational conflict in the 
following year. Table 5 and Table 6 results indicate that organizations experiencing a 
drop in Leadership Unity are systematically more likely to experience intra-
organizational conflict, with a p-value of <0.05. 
This finding concerning the effects of a drop in Leadership Unity on intra-
organizational conflict is similar to the results reported by Asal when examining the 
effects of leadership structures on the likelihood of an organization splitting.51  The 
different effects on the dependent variable of steady-state divided leadership versus a 
drop in Leadership Unity into divided leadership might be explained because both a 
                                                 
51 Victor Asal, Mitchell Brown, and Angela Dalton, “Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethno-
Political Organizations in the Middle East,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 1 (February 2012): 94–
117. 
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divided leadership style and a united leadership style, when stable, can each provide 
benefits to the organization. As described above, and as found by Asal in his examination 
of the literature associated with leadership effects on schism, there are some potential 
advantages to a divided leadership structure.  However, these benefits, if any, would have 
to be balanced against the increased risk of intra-organizational conflict.52  Also, a 
sudden Drop in Leadership Unity is likely to be associated with an emergency or 
dysfunction within the group. A drop is therefore more likely to be followed by intra-
organizational conflict or even group division than by the sudden appearance of divided 
leadership benefits. 
Table 5. Logit Regression Results: Conflict vs. Leadership Change  
 
 
As with the first model, this second model again produces statistical evidence that 
seems to support both the importance and the hypothesized direction of influence of each 
                                                 
52 Victor Asal, Mitchell Brown, and Angela Dalton, “Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethno-
Political Organizations in the Middle East,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 1 (February 2012): 95. 
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of the independent variables, except for the use of state violence, as summarized in Table 
6.  Again, the insignificant coefficient for State Violence evidence provides no support 
for Hypothesis 4, indicating instead that State Violence has no consistent effect on the 
likelihood of intra-organizational conflict. 
Table 6. Results of Testing Hypotheses Using Second Model 
 Independent Variable 
Predicted Effect on Intra-
organizational Conflict Results 
1b. Drop in Leadership Unity Increase Increase 
2 Foreign Support Increase Increase 
3 Legal Increase Increase 
4 State Violence Decrease No Statistically Significant Finding 
5 Controls Territory Increase Increase 
6 Pro-Authoritarian Increase Increase 
 
B. SUBSTANTIVE SIGNIFICANCE 
Having found a high level of statistical significance for the factors Drop in 
Leadership Unity, Foreign Support, Legal, Controls Territory, and Pro-Authoritarian, 
how might we quantify their effects on the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict?  
Do they show substantive significance in addition to statistical significance?  The effects 
of each independent variable on the dependent variable are visualized in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Size of Effect for a Shift of Each Independent Variable 
 
 
The results show that while the independent variables differ in the strength of 
their effect on the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict (the horizontal line through 
each bar), and in their confidence intervals (the size of the gray bars), all of the 
statistically-significant independent variables also show a substantively-significant effect 
on the likelihood of the dependent variable.  As we can see in Figure 2, a shift in the 
factor Drop in Leadership United causes a 600% increase in a group’s likelihood of 
experiencing internal conflict in the next year, or a change from about 2% percent to 
12%.  Foreign Support and Legal both increased the likelihood of intra-organizational 
conflict by about 400%, or a change from about 0.5% to 2.5% in the next year.  The 
variable Controls Territory increased the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict by 
about 500%, or a change from about 2% to 13% likelihood.  Finally, the variable Pro-
Authoritarian increased the likelihood by 250%, or from about 2% to about 7%. 
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C. STRENGTH OF SUPPORT TO HYPOTHESES 
In summary, the results indicate that the variables Drop in Leadership Unity, 
Foreign Support, Legal, Controls Territory, and Pro-Authoritarian variables impact the 
dependent variable in a statistically significant and substantively significant way.  See 
Table 7. 















Unity Increase Increase <0.05 +500% 
2 
Foreign 
Support Increase Increase <0.05 +400% 
3 Legal Increase Increase <0.01 +400% 




Finding N/A N/A 
5 
Controls 
Territory Increase Increase <0.01 +500% 
6 
Pro-




The results of the analysis reported here generally support the hypotheses derived 
from the logic of the frustration-aggression model. In particular, I find that Foreign 
Support, Organizational Legality, Territorial Control, and Pro-Authoritarian ideologies 
all increase the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict. 
The results do not support the hypothesis that Leadership Unity reduces the 
likelihood of intra-organizational conflict. However, the results do support the hypothesis 
that a recent shift from united to divided leadership does increase the likelihood of intra-
organizational conflict. This may be due to the destabilizing effect of a sudden change in 
leadership dynamics. While there may be reasons for organizations to deliberately choose 
a divided leadership structure, a sudden change from united to divided leadership may 
indicate that the change was not calculated, and that even if calculated may trigger 
increased intra-organizational violence. It is also interesting that although State Violence 
did not reduce group intra-organizational conflict as hypothesized, it also did not have the 
opposite effect. This finding may indicate that the strategy of using state violence against 
militant ethno-political groups has no discernable effect on intra-organizational conflict, 
that the effects are roughly balanced in either direction in a bimodal or other complex 
distribution, that the dataset examined is too small to detect the effect, or that the model 
as constructed is somehow ill-designed to capture the effect.  These possibilities suggest 
areas for further research. 
B. COMPARING WITH PREVIOUS FINDINGS  
The most directly comparable findings in the literature, particularly as they apply 
to ethnopolitical groups in the MENA region, are from Asal et al., in which several 
similar independent variables and a similar dependent variable were examined.  The 
dependent variable for Asal et al. was organizational split, while the dependent variable 
in this thesis is intra-organizational conflict.  The definition of an organizational split is 
very narrowly defined to be an event where one MAR group spawns another.  The bar is 
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set very high for this event to occur.  First, a group only qualifies as a MAR group if it 
comprises at least one percent of the population and has at least 100,000 members.  A 
split is only said to have occurred if a new group emerges from an existing group, the 
new group fully qualifies as a MAR group on its own, and the new group continues to 
exist for at least three years.53  One can imagine cases in which MAR groups, especially 
small ones, might not produce large enough splinter groups to meet the definition.  Also, 
the new groups might not last over three years.  If either of those possibilities occurs, the 
split is not counted.  Therefore, under the Asal et al. approach, a group may experience a 
tremendous amount of intra-organizational conflict, may lose small splinter groups that 
are never counted, may lose large splinter groups that do not exist long enough to be 
counted, and may even go through multi-splinter episodes below the defined threshold 
without registering any occurrences of the dependent variable event.  When comparing 
the results of the Asal et al. paper and this thesis, these differences between the dependent 
variables should be kept in mind. 
Despite these significant differences between the dependent variables, one can 
imagine that both dependent variables might be sensitive to similar independent variables 
in similar ways. The same factors which systematically increase the likelihood of intra-
organizational conflict might be expected to have the same effect on the likelihood of 
organizational divide.  However, the findings are mixed when the papers are compared.  
Both studies found that groups with a lack of united leadership were more likely to 
experience organizational split or intra-organizational conflict, respectively.  In addition, 
neither study found statistically significant results concerning the effects of state violence 
directed against militant groups. However, Asal found no statistically significant result 
when modeling whether foreign support or legal status affected the likelihood of splits, 
while this study found that both factors increased the likelihood of intra-organizational 
conflict. Asal et al. did not look at the effects of territorial control, or the effects of pro-
authoritarian ideologies.  However, this paper found that both of those factors did have 
statistically significant effects in increasing the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict. 
                                                 
53 Victor Asal, Mitchell Brown, and Angela Dalton, “Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethno-
Political Organizations in the Middle East,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 1 (February 2012): 104. 
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The results, while not entirely consistent and not entirely overlapping, could still 
be seen as relatively compatible.  One might imagine that Asal et al. found no statistically 
significant results for the effects of foreign support or legal status due to the stricter 
dependent variable they used.  If one imagines that an organization splitting is the worst 
case scenario along the scale of possible types of intra-organizational conflict, then one 
might expect it to occur less frequently.  Therefore, the data set might not have contained 
an adequate number of instances where the dependent variable occurred to produce a 
statistically significant result. 
However, this line of logic does is not persuasive.  Asal et al. report that their 
dependent variable occurred in just under 3% of their organization-years,54 and in this 
paper the dependent variable occurs in even fewer, or 2.2% of organization-years. 
Perhaps the difference in results could be attributed to the fact that the Asal et al. 
paper uses a sample of both militant and non-militant groups, while this paper uses only 
militant groups.  Why would these factors systematically increase the likelihood of intra-
organizational conflict among militant MENA ethnopolitical groups, but have no 
statistically-significant systematic effect on the likelihood that a broader population of 
militant and non-militant MENA ethno-political groups will split? 
C. APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
There are several ways to translate these findings into implications for policy and 
military action.  For example, a policy or action that causes a drop in the degree of 
leadership unity (such as decapitation or otherwise provoking a contested leadership 
environment) should systematically increase the likelihood of intra-organizational 
conflict.  In addition, foreign support should be understood to have potential intentional 
or unintentional effects of manipulating a group’s agenda, disproportionately aiding some 
sub-groups over others, and attracting low-commitment or profiteering recruits. All of 
these dynamics may increase intra-organizational conflict.  Manipulating the legal status 
of a militant ethnopolitical group also seems to hold promise for those who seek to affect 
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a group’s level of intra-organizational conflict. A policymaker or military planner may 
create or emphasize legal, nonviolent paths for ethnopolitical groups to make progress 
towards stated goals.  If an organization is given legal options, this may help to “steal the 
issue” from militant groups claiming to provide the only path to change.  Legal paths for 
reintegration and amnesty may increase internal conflict by undermining the logic and 
rhetoric justifying the group’s continued existence and its continued use of violence. 
Also, increasing the group’s perception that its leadership is authoritarian and intolerant 
of dissent, or causing the leadership to act that way, may increase conflict by generating 
frustration and aggression processes within the organization. 
Finally, a militant organization that finds itself challenged to control territory 
might be racked by the difficulty and expense of security and governance, may fight 
internally over resource allocation and the hypocrisy of its failures as an alternative to the 
state, and may as a result become an easier target for isolation and conventional 
operations.  The Jihadist strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, in addition to recommending 
against a traditional hierarchy and for moving to acephalous organizational structure, also 
recommended against the attempt to control or govern territory because he observed that 
it would make Jihadist organizations too easy to isolate and target through air or other 
conventional operations.55  It seemed to al-Suri that a Jihadist group under isolation and 
defending itself from conventional armed forces attack might be less likely to achieve its 
strategic aims, and more likely to struggle with intra-organizational conflict over the cost, 
complexities, and dangers of defending, controlling, and governing territory.  The results 
presented here thus lend support to Al Suri’s analysis. 
D. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although this study applied a certain set of assumptions and coding predicated 
upon a certain logic, there are many other permutations of model specifications that could 
be applied to the same data sets.  In order to increase confidence in the findings of this 
paper, additional work could be done using different and more complex modeling and 
analysis techniques.  For example, the models in this paper examine the statistical 
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evidence for whether there is a conditionally monotonic and linear relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables.  Examining the variables in the light of other 
models and other possible relationships could reveal more nuanced or even different 
results. 
In attempting to identify the conditions under which militant ethnopolitical groups 
are more likely to experience intra-organizational conflict, there are certainly other 
established models of political movements, conflict theories, and other frameworks 
around which to build hypotheses and to analyze the data.  Even using the same model 
and the same framework of analysis, other data sets from different or larger regions, or 
coding group characteristics and factors in different ways, may yield different results.  In 
any of these cases, further research would be illuminating. 
The finding that united leadership provided no systematic decrease in intra-
organizational conflict may support the contention that organizations may exist in either 
condition in a steady state without a major impact on intra-organizational conflict.  This 
comports with the political science insight that while united leadership has its advantages, 
a divided leadership strategy might have some as well.  It might provide a “big tent” 
organization style allowing for a more diverse membership and preventing the 
frustrations and conflict associated with the internal policing of minor dissent.56 On the 
other hand, the findings do show that a sudden drop in leadership unity systematically 
increases the likelihood of intra-organizational conflict.  This finding is similar to the 
Asal et al. finding that divided leadership tends to increase the likelihood of 
organizational divide, but is limited to the cases in which a drop in leadership unity 
occurred. 
Finally, the finding that state violence against a group does not appear to increase 
or decrease intra-organizational conflict may indicate that ethno-political groups in 
particular have a capacity to absorb state violence without experiencing the type of 
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internal conflict that might otherwise be expected.  Perhaps just as the “sticky”57 nature 
of ethnicity can create centuries-long rivalries and resentments, it may also lend 
ethnopolitical groups a particularly durable quality under certain circumstances and under 
certain pressures, such as state violence. 
For policy makers and military planners, this implies that our understanding of the 
effects of state violence on group morale and cohesion may need to be reexamined and 
refined.  If state violence actually succeeds in destroying a group, then the degree of 
intra-organizational conflict it generates becomes irrelevant.  However, in cases where 
state violence does not destroy a group, the effect on the group’s intra-organizational 
conflict level should give us pause.  Indeed, the finding that state use of violence against 
militant MENA ethno-political groups may not systematically affect intra-organizational 
conflict seems to echo the findings of scholars like Robert A. Pape, who contends that a 
more careful examination of the evidence supporting the use of strategic bombing as a 
tool of coercion reveals historical evidence of its surprisingly frequent failures.58  Just as 
Pape revealed some counterintuitive but useful findings through the examination of 
historic conflict data, perhaps this thesis can also contribute some minor insights useful to 
current and future research into the intersection of political violence, rebel groups, ethnic 
conflict, and the Middle East and North Africa region. 
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